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Since the government has unsuccessfully sought review by the Supreme
Court to settle the conflict among circuits (as to results),l8 new legislation
would appear to be the best solution. 19
One approach would be to tax the widow when the payment:
1. Is based on services rendered by the deceased,
2. Would not have arisen had there not been the employer-employee
relationship, and
3. Is claimed by the employer as a business expense.20
Where these requirements are not met, the payment should be taxfree.
CLAUDE

L.

EICHEL

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFER OF APPRECIATED
PROPERTY IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
In 1954, the taxpayer and his then spouse entered into a voluntary
property settlement and separation agreement. The agreement provided
for support payments and the transfer of certain personal property to the
wife, and was later incorporated into the divorce decree. One-half of the
property involved in the settlement, represented by five hundred shares
trial court merely had found "gift" without stating the determining facts or legal standard
involved in its decision. 363 U.S. 278, 292. Upon remand, the trial court found a gift
again, this time setting forth in detail the reasons for its conclusions. 186 F. Supp. 393
(E.D.N.Y. 1960). The circuit affirmed finding the verdict not "clearly erroneous." 287
F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1961).
18. The Supreme Court denied writs of certiorari simultaneously in the instant case,
and the Olsen, Frankel, Smith, and Martin cases (supra note 15). Chief Justice Warren
was of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted. 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1962).
19. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960),
suggested: "If there is fear of undue uncertainty or overmuch litigation, Congress may
make more precise its treatment of the matter by singling out certain factors and making
them determinative of the matter."
20. The Revenue Act of 1962 added § 274(b) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
This section provides that no deduction shall be allowed (as a business expense) for gifts
in excess of $25 to any individual during a taxable year. For purposes of the section,
"gift" means any item excludable from the gross income of the recipient under § 102.
Applying this new section to the "gifts to widows" area would seem to limit the
employer's deduction to $5,025, since $5000 would be excludable to the widow under
§ 101(b) (to which § 274(b) does not apply), and the balance would fall within the
$25 limitation.
Of course, the employer could take the position of the Internal Revenue Service in
Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 Cum. BULL-that payments to widows are generally not gifts,
and that the payment is not excludable to the widow under § 102.
Where the employer can establish an intent not to make a gift to the widow in order
to obtain a deduction for the payment, it would seem that the widow is out of luck as
far as the possibility of excluding the payment from her income under § 102, since the
law is that the intent of the payor determines the character of the payment. Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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of stock, was delivered by the taxpayer in 1955, pursuant to the agreement. The Commissioner determined that there was a taxable gain on the
transfer. The Court of Claims reversed and held that the transfer was
non-taxable.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed: the
transferor of appreciated property in divorce proceedings, in exchange
for the relinquishment of a spouse's marital rights, realizes taxable gain
on the transfer, notwithstanding the difficulty of establishing a valuation
for the property. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).2
For a number of years there has been a conflict in the federal courts
as to the taxability of transfers of appreciated property in divorce
settlements. The basis of the conflict has been the controlling statutory
language of section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
provides that the gain from the disposition of property "shall be the
excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis." 3 The
statute further provides that the "amount realized" is "the sum of any
money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received."4 It has not been clear from the terms of the statute
whether it was permissible to measure gain by reference to the fair
market value of the property transferred. And, if the amount realized
could be measured by the property transferred in some situations, could
the gain be so measured in the tense atmosphere of a marital settlement?
The nature of this type of income has never created an issue as to
its taxability.' Originally, the Tax Court (at that time the Board of Tax
Appeals) held that the accretion to property transferred pursuant to a
divorce settlement could not be taxed as capital gain to the transferor
because the amount realized by the satisfaction of the husband's marital
obligations was indeterminable and because, even if such benefit were
ascertainable, the transaction represented a non-taxable division of
property.' However, upon being reversed in quick succession by the
Courts of Appeals of the Second and Third Circuits,7 the Tax Court
accepted the position of these courts and has continued to apply these
1. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
2. The Court also resolved another question, which is not elaborated upon here, in
favor of the Commissioner. It was held that a husband was not entitled to a deduction
for fees paid to his wife's attorney for tax advice given her in relation to a property
settlement agreement, since the expense was not paid "in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax" of the taxpayer himself, as required by INT. RV.
CODE OF 1954, § 212(3).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a).

4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b). (Emphasis added.)
5. The Court found the "shotgun" clause, "all income from whatever source derived,
including . . . gains derived from dealings in property," in the statutory definition of
gross income applicable. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
6. Walter S. Halliwell, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941); L. W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940).
7. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Mesta,
123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941). (Hereinafter, all reference to "circuits" will refer to United
States Courts of Appeals.)
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views in appropriate cases since that time.' In Commissioner v. Mesta9
and Commissioner v. Halliwell,'0 the courts reasoned that the accretion
to the property was "realized" by the transfer, and that this gain could
be measured on the assumption that the relinquished marital rights were
equal in value to the property transferred. The matter was considered
settled until the Sixth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court's holding in
Commissioner v. Marshman," ruled that although such a transfer might
be a taxable event, the gain realized thereby could not be determined
because of the impossibility of evaluating the fair market value of the
wife's marital rights. This was essentially the position taken by the Court
of Claims in the instant case.
Although there has been no difficulty in finding the transaction to be
a taxable event to the transferor, measuring such gain has presented a
more difficult problem. Mesta and Halliwell, on the one hand, stood for
the position that gain could be realized for income tax purposes, although
reference to the value of property "received" must be indirectly measured

by the value of property transferred. The Sixth Circuit had already
reversed itself on this particular point in United States v. General Shoe

Corp., 2 but distinguished its earlier decision in Marshman18 as merely
holding that gain realized in marital property settlements is not susceptible of fair market valuation. Accordingly, there was no conflict between
circuit courts on the question of whether section 1001 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 precluded a finding of taxable gain merely because

the gain on the transfer must be measured by the fair market value of
what is transferred. However, the language of the Court of Claims, 4
in the instant case, expressly conflicted with the circuit courts, and

narrowly construed the statute to limit measurement of gain by the value
of property received.' 5
8. Homer H. Marshman, 31 T.C..269 (1958); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958);
Estate of Gordon A. Stouffer, 30 T.C. 1244 (1958); Cristina De Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C.
816 (1949); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
9. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
10. 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942).
11. 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
12. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). The Sixth Circuit
approved the idea that, in some instances, gain can be realized for tax purposes, although
reference to the value of property "received" must be measured by the value of property
transferred. Other decisions, which have in substance held that taxable income is realized
on dispositions which give the taxpayer his "money's worth," include International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943), and Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940).
13. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960).
14. The Court of Claims perpetuated the section 1001 issue, discussed in notes 4
and 5 supra. In holding that Davis realized no taxable gain, the court said: "We say this
because the statute, Section 1001(b), expressly states that the amount realized from the
sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair
market value of the property received. We think . . .that the measurement of gain cannot
be the fair market value of the property transferred." Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d
168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
15. The Court of Claims stated: "If the 'property' received by Davis had no fair
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The issue confronting the court was: When did Congress intend for
the accretion from the economic growth of stock to be taxed? Even
though the lower courts were in accord in deciding that the actual transfer
might be a taxable event, they could not agree upon the method or even
the feasibility of measuring the gain. Thus the Court undertook the
problem of deciding whether the transfer to the wife was a taxable event
to the taxpaper husband,16 and if so, whether the taxpayer's gain was
susceptible of measurement.
The Court first decided that the Commissioner was correct in his
determination that the disposition of the stock involved a taxable transfer
of property in exchange for the release of an independent legal obligation. 17 The taxpayer's argument that the disposition was comparable
to a non-taxable division of property between two co-owners was
rejected."8 The taxpayer was a resident of Delaware, 9 a common law
jurisdiction, and the Court refused to equate the status of the property
interests with those rights found in community property jurisdictions.
Although recognizing the disparity created by the differing effects on
the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences between community
property and common law systems, the Court decided that it was the
responsibility of Congress to alleviate the disparity.2"
market value, or if none has been shown, it may be economic gain but it is not taxable
gain by reason of the express provision of section 1001(b). Champlin v. Commissioner,
10th Cir., 71 F.2d 23, 29." Davis v. -United States, supra note 14.
16. Since there was no conflict between any of the lower courts on the issue of the
transfer being a taxable event, the Court apparently considered the question on its own
prerogative.
17. Taxability in both Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), and
Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), was predicated upon the theory
that the contractual obligation imposed by a property settlement agreement was in substitution for the legal obligation of support imposed by applicable state laws. The courts
concluded that the discharge of a legal obligation could neither be treated as a gift nor
as a division of property.
18. In support of his argument, the taxpayer pointed out that the division of property
was contained in one paragraph of the separation agreement, whereas certain cash payments in lieu of alimony were in another paragraph. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d
168, 173 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
19. Under Delaware law, the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property
are far removed from co-ownership. The wife has no interest whatsoever over the management or disposition of her, husband's personal property; her rights are not descendable,
and she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage
she shares in the property only to the extent the court deems "reasonable." 13 DEL. CODE
ANN. § 1531(a) (1953). What is "reasonable" depends upon -the facts and circumstances
of the individual case. Beres v. Beres, 52 Del. 133, 154 A.2d 384 (1959). Thus, Delaware
seems only to place a burden on the husband's property, rather than to make a wife a
part owner thereof. The rights of succession and "reasonable share" more closely approach
the husband's obligations of support and alimony, than a division of property by coowners.
20. In recognizing this disparity, the Court pointed out that in the past it "has not
ignored the differing effects on the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences between
community property and common-law systems. E.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930)
... " The Court also noted that "Congress has seen fit to alleviate this disparity in many
areas, e.g., Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 110, but in other areas the facts of life are still
with us." United States'v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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In further justification of its position that the transaction was a
taxable event, the Court noted that its interpretation of the general
statutory language was "fortified by the long-standing administrative
practice, as sounded and formalized by the settled state of law in the
lower courts."'"
Having thus determined that the transaction was a taxable event,
the Court turned to the more difficult problem of measuring the gain
realized by the taxpayer. A presumptive yardstick was used to measure
the gain, and the Court quoted an earlier decision of the Court of Claims
itself, that the values "of the two properties exchanged in an arms-length
transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal." 2
Although recognizing that the arm's length nature of the exchange was
weakened by the emotion, tension and practical necessities involved in
divorce negotiations, the Court nonetheless overruled the conflicting theory
adopted by the Court of Claims in this case. 23 In so holding, the Court
reasoned that it was being "more consistent with [the] general purpose
and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a rough approximation of the
gain realized . . . [rather] than to ignore altogether its tax conse-

quences." 4
The Court realized that its decision was likely to cause other problems to arise in the future. However, inasmuch as it was not confronted
with these problems in the instant case, it disposed of them by dicta and
through footnotes. In the author's opinioi, the dicta in the case may
have consequences
almost as important and far reaching as the holding
5
2

itself.

21. The Court of Claims and the Courts of Appeals were all in accord with the
proposition that the transfer represented a taxable event. In choosing not to disturb such
a settled rule, the Court went on to add: "Such unanimity of views in support of a position representing a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute will not lightly be
put aside." United States v. Davis, supra note 20.
22. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 172, 126
F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9
(6th Cir. 1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1943).
23. In deciding Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), the Court of
Claims had followed the holding in Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.
1960), that the determination of a fair market value requires a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell. It reasoned that this
element was necessarily lacking in a transaction involving the emotion, tension, and
practical necessities involved in a divorce proceeding.
24. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56, 67 (1942).
25. In stating that, in deciding the particular income tax question involved, it did
not find itself fettered by the language and considerations of the estate and gift tax
statutes, the Court was following the reasoning of Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner,
160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). The particular language that the Court was referring to was
the language of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2512 and §'2043, as follows:
Section 2512. VALUATION OF GIFTS (a) If the gift is made in property, the
value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift.
(b) Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of
the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift . . ..
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The holding with regard to the taxability of the husband, and the
method of measuring his gain is structurally sound. It serves to promote
Section 2043. TRANSFERS FOR INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION (a)
* . . any . . . transfers, . . . not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, . . . shall be included in the gross estate
. . . at the time of death ....
(b) . . . For purposes of this chapter, a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower
or curtesy, or of any other marital rights . . . shall not be considered to any
extent a consideration "in money or money's worth."
The Court discussed the possibility of and reasons for not asserting the gift tax on
the transfer. United States v. Davis, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1192 n.6 (1962). The possibility of
gift tax arose because of the fact that the taxpayer husband transferred property to another "for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512, supra. Although the Court correctly found the gift
tax inapplicable to the instant situation, the discussion did not make mention of section
2516 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides that: "Where husband and
wife enter into a written agreement relative to their marital and property rights and
divorce occurs within 2 years thereafter (whether or not such agreement is approved by
the divorce decree), any transfers of property or interests in property made pursuant to
such agreement-(1) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or property rights
.. . shall be deemed to be transfers made for a full and adequate consideration in money
or money's worth." This section, by itself, would have rendered inapplicable in this case
(so far as the gift tax was concerned) the decisions cited by the Court, all of which were
rendered prior to the enactment of this section. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945);
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); see Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106
(1950), which has been abrogated in part by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2516, so that it
is no longer necessary to have a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce
decree if divorce actually occurs within 2 years after the written agreement was entered
into. The decisions cited were cases in which the Court had held transfers of property in
exchange for the release of marital rights subject to the gift tax, and the Court noted
here that these decisions were not based on the premise that the transactions were inherently gifts, but rather on the concept that in the contemplation of the gift tax statute
they are to be taxed as gifts. However, since there is no estate tax counterpart of section
2516, it is arguable that the value of property transferred in exchange for marital rights,
pursuant to a divorce or separation agreement which was never actually incorporated in
a decree of divorce, should be included in the transferor's gross estate for estate tax purposes. Conversely, it is also arguable that section 2516 should be applied to the estate tax
sections. Both of these conflicting arguments are supported by the doctrine that the. federal
estate and gift taxes are construed in pari materia, since the purpose of the gift tax is to
complement the estate tax by preventing tax-free depletion of the transferor's* estate
during his lifetime. Commissioner v. Wemyss, supra; Merrill v. Fahs, supra; Harris v.
Commissioner, supra.
A second problem disposed of by dicta was that of the wife's basis in the property.
Although she realized no taxable income on the exchange, she was given a cost basis in
the stock received, determined by reference to its fair market value in the hands of the
transferor, because INTr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012 provides that: "The basis of property
shall be the cost of such property, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter . .. ."
The Court reasoned that if the Court of Claims' position was followed with regard to the
husband, the wife's "cost" for the property, i.e., the value of the marital rights relinquished therefor, would be indeterminable, and if she subsequently disposed of the property
she might suffer inordinately over the Commissioner's assessment which she would have
the burden of proving erroneous. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 468 (1959) was
cited by the Court. Further by way of dicta, the Court stated: "Under the present administrative practice, the release of marital rights in exchange for [sic) property or other
consideration is not considered a taxable event as to the wife." United States v. Davis,
82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194 n.7 (1962). Although the holding with regard to the taxability of
the husband is sound, it is the author's opinion 'that there is no basis, other than administrative practice, for not treating the release as a taxable event to the wife. For a
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the intent of Congress in enacting the taxing statutes, 26 and to solidify
the position of numerous taxpayers who must have relied on the earlier
discussion of the aspects of considering the exchange a taxable event as to the wife, see
Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L. REv. 19, 30
(1951); Comment, The Lump Sum Divorce Settlement as a Taxable Exchange, 8 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 593, 601-02 (1961).
The Court stated that the wife's "cost" basis for the property received would be the
value of the marital rights relinquished therefor. But it appears that the Court, in giving
the wife a "substitute" basis, applied the concept of nonrecognition of gain to a situation
which involved neither business property, nor the exchange of "like for like." Section
1031(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for a basis for property received
in a nontaxable exchange, as described in section 1031(a), measured by the value of the
property given up. Section 1031(a) provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if
property held for productive use in a trade or business, or for investment (not including
stocks, bonds, notes, or similar evidences of interest or indebtedness) are exchanged solely
for property of a like kind. In this case the wife exchanged her marital rights for her
husband's shares of stock, thus placing the transaction outside the purview of section 1031.
Nor do any of the other common nontaxable exchange provisions apply, e.g., section 1032,
exchanges by a corporation of its stock for property; section 1033, involuntary conversions; section 1034, sale or exchange of a residence; section 1035, certain exchanges of
insurance policies; section 1036, stock for stock of the same corporation; and section 1037,
certain exchanges of United States obligations.
The Court has never hesitated to tax, as ordinary income, the relinquishment of
similar intangible personal property rights, in situations somewhat analogous to the situation in the instant case.
A covenant not to engage in a competitive business is a valuable intangible property
right. Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954).
The relinquishment thereof is a taxable event, gain being measured by the value of the
property bargained and received therefor. Estate of Beals v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1936). See also Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297
U.S. 106 (1936); Cox v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1934). There are other instances where taxable income was found to result from the relinquishment of personal
rights pursuant to a contract or agreement: The release of a fianc6 from a promise to
marry in exchange for a valuable consideration would result in taxable income. Ehrlich
v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Monies paid to a baseball player to secure
his consent to the production of a motion picture which might have been regarded as
invading his privacy were held to be taxable. Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920
(E. D. Tenn. 1959). Amounts paid to obtain the taxpayer's consent to a motion picture
portraying his deceased father and himself were held taxable, even though the right of
privacy was not a property right under applicable state law. Runyon v. United States,
281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960).
In the instant case, the wife has merely relinquished a valuable intangible personal
property right in exchange for other valuable property with a readily ascertainable fair
market value.
It is further the author's opinion that, since she is to be given a "cost" basis equal
to the value of the property received, thus reducing her gain on ultimate disposition, she
should be held to have realized taxable income to the extent that the value of the property
received exceeded the "cost or other basis" of the property given up-namely the zero
basis of her promise. INT. REV. CooE or 1954, § 1031(b) provides that: "Gain From Exchanges Not Solely in Kind . . . shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of
the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property." To hold otherwise only serves to provide the spouse receiving the marketable property with an unwarranted windfall.
26. Cf. notes 20 and 24 supra. The Court also noted the possibility that "this notorious construction was relied upon by . . . the Congress itself, which not only refrained
from making any changes in the statutory language during more than a score of years
but reenacted this same language in 1954." United States v. Davis, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194
(1962).

19621

CASES NOTED

decisions. It will also eliminate the uncertainties which previously
existed in the negotiation of property settlements by parties to a divorce.
On the other hand, it does not seem quite fair to assert income tax on
one party upon what amounts to a division of his property, while
ignoring the tax consequences to the other party.27 The far reaching
effects of this decision on everyday transactions in lawyers' offices can
only be suggested by reference to the number of divorce settlements
handled in the United States each year.28 Unless Congress sees fit to
enact legislation to alter the effect of this decision in the future,' it
appears that the question of realization and measurement of the transferor's gain is finally settled.
CHAR ES

L. RUFFNER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE OF THE
SMITH ACT
The petitioners were convicted of violating the membership clause
of the Smith Act,' and their convictions were upheld by the respective
courts of appeals.' Each petitioner had been a long-term member of the
Communist Party, recruiting new personnel and instructing them in
basic Party doctrine. Each petitioner had also been a lecturer and an
organizer, holding offices high in the Party'hierarchy. On certiorari, the
petitioners contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
verdicts.' Held: affirmed as to petitioner Scales, reversed as to petitioner
Noto. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
These were the first prosecutions initiated by the Government under
the membership clause4 of the Smith Act, although previous prosecutions
27. Note 25 supra.
28. There were 395,000 divorces in the United States in 1959; 19,550 of them were
obtained in the State of Florida. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTs 302, 309 (77th ed.
1962).
29. Any prospect of contrary legislation seems remote; see note 26 supra.
1. "Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
government by force or violence;: or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof . . . shall be fined
or imprisoned . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
2. Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Noto v. United States, 262

F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1958).
3. Other contentions of petitioners were directed towards: (1) an alleged immunity from
prosecution granted by section 4(f) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(f) (1958); and (2) the alleged unconstitutionality of the Smith Act, for violating
the First and Fifth Amendments. A minority of the Court in each case voted to reverse
the conviction on the above grounds.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).

